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Abstract
Objective: To identify associations between market factors, especially relative reimbursement rates, and the probability
of surgery and cost per episode for three medical conditions (cataract, benign prostatic neoplasm, and knee
degeneration) with multiple treatment options.
Methods: We use 2004–2006 Medicare claims data for elderly beneficiaries from sixty nationally representative
communities to estimate multivariate models for the probability of surgery and cost per episode of care as a
function local market factors, including Medicare physician reimbursement for surgical versus non-surgical treatment
and the availability of primary care and specialty physicians. We used Symmetry’s Episode Treatment Groups (ETG)
software to group claims into episodes for the three conditions (n=540,874 episodes).
Results: Higher Medicare reimbursement for surgical episodes and greater availability of the relevant specialists are
significantly associated with more surgery and higher cost per episode for all three conditions, while greater availability
of primary care physicians is significantly associated with less frequent surgery and lower cost per episode.
Conclusion: Relative Medicare reimbursement rates for surgical vs. non-surgical treatments and the availability of both
primary care physicians and relevant specialists are associated with the likelihood of surgery and cost per episode.
Keywords: Medicare reimbursement; Geographic variation in Medicare cost per episode; Physician supply
Background
A recent study found little correlation across geographic
areas in the cost per episode of treating ten different high
prevalence and high cost conditions in the Medicare
population [1]. Moreover, there was little consistency
in the relationship between spending per episode for
the different conditions and total Medicare spending
per beneficiary in the area. Similarly, the Institute of
Medicine concluded that geographic variations in cost per
Medicare beneficiary do not reflect systematic variations
across areas in how individual physicians treat particular
conditions [2]. These reports suggest that general market
characteristics, such as the per capita numbers of specialists,
primary care physicians, and hospital beds do not have
uniform effects on the cost of treating different conditions.
There are several potential reasons why cost per episode
for particular conditions might vary across regions. First,
physicians in some markets might have a lower threshold
for diagnosing a particular condition. For instance, in the
case of cataracts, late diagnosis could raise the average cost
per episode because a higher proportion of cases might
require surgery within a given year. Second, physicians
in some markets might treat particular conditions more
aggressively. For instance, for osteoarthritis of the knee,
the threshold to offer knee replacement might vary across
geographic areas. The reasons for these differences are not
well understood, but may be influenced by a combination
of local market conditions such as variations in specific
reimbursement rates, the relative supplies of generalist and
specialty physicians who can treat a particular condition,
and differences in physicians’ approach to care.
Past research has documented regional variations in
Medicare spending and the use of specific services per
beneficiary [3-5], or costs and service use for people with
specific illnesses [6-10]. Although some of the condition-
specific studies examined correlations with the supplies of
physicians or hospital beds in the area, they typically
employed univariate comparisons, omitting potentially
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the role of area-specific reimbursement differences as a
possible source of geographic variations.
One previous study investigated geographic variations
(across thirteen metropolitan areas) in cost per episode
for seven specific conditions and also found considerable
inconsistencies in the relative costliness of different con-
ditions within an area [11]. For example, compared to
national average costs per episode, Minneapolis was 24%
less costly for pneumonia and 28% more costly for coron-
ary artery disease (CAD), while Miami was 34% less costly
for CAD and 28% more costly for type-2 diabetes.
A more detailed comparison of cost per episode of CAD
in Miami and Minneapolis suggested that different coding
practices within the broad CAD designation might explain
some of the difference in cost per episode. Specifically,
physicians in Miami coded for a more narrow definition
of CAD along with separate episodes of related conditions,
while physicians in Minneapolis coded CAD under a
broader definition that included related conditions that
were coded separately in Miami. Accounting for differ-
ences in the number of episodes eliminated almost all of
the cost difference, which shrank from $1,909 to $200 per
person with a CAD episode. This analysis highlights the
importance of using precisely defined clinical conditions
for studying geographic variations in cost per episode.
To investigate whether condition-specific health care
market factors, especially relative reimbursement rates for
surgical and non-surgical treatments, are associated with
geographic variation in the cost of treating episodes of differ-
ent conditions, we analyzed three common conditions (cata-
ract, benign prostatic neoplasm, and knee degeneration)
characterized by substantial treatment choice discretion. The
empirical analysis was guided by a conceptual framework
that emphasizes the availability of specialists most closely
associated with treating each condition, the availability of
competing primary care physicians, and relative Medicare
reimbursements for surgical and non-surgical treatments
as factors that might influence treatment patterns.
Methods
Choice of conditions
The three conditions selected for analysis are prevalent in
the Medicare population, are costly in aggregate, are treated
by a mix of primary care and specific specialty physicians,
and vary considerably in potential treatment aggressiveness.
Each of these conditions is considered chronic and pro-
gressive if untreated. The three conditions also span vari-
ous treatment settings: cataract surgery is outpatient; knee
replacement surgery is almost exclusively an inpatient
procedure; and treatment for benign prostatic neoplasm
spans a range of surgical and non-surgical options.
Currently, there are no alternative treatments to cataract
surgery. Rather, discretion related to cataract surgery
depends on the threshold for offering or seeking surgical
correction. Generally, surgery is offered when the cataract
degrades vision to an extent that is noticeable by the
patient, but there is no clearly defined threshold at which
surgery should or should not be offered. Benign prostatic
neoplasm can be treated by a variety of surgical approaches,
which we combined into a single “surgery” category for
analysis. Alternatives to surgery include no treatment and
medical treatment, typically with alpha blockers (e.g.,
Flomax) or 5-alpha reductase inhibitors (e.g., finasteride).
Effective surgical treatment for knee degeneration is limited
to knee replacement, although in some circumstances, pa-
tients will be offered arthroscopic procedures to “clean out”
the knee. Common alternatives include medication as well
as joint injections with either steroids or products such as
synvisc, which may temporarily help with symptoms. As
with cataract, there is no clearly defined threshold for decid-
ing when knee replacement surgery should be performed.
Sample
We used claims data from a sample of elderly non-
institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries without end-stage
renal disease who were continuously enrolled in Parts A
and B of the traditional fee-for-service program between
2004 and 2006, and who resided in sixty nationally repre-
sentative communities from the Community Tracking Study
(CTS) [12]. We included all Medicare claims of beneficiaries
who received any billed service from a respondent to the
2004–2005 CTS Physician Survey at any time during the
three-year period 2004–2006
a. After exclusions, the full
sample provided 4,448,612 annual observations. Details of
the general sample design are provided elsewhere [13].
We used the Symmetry Episode Treatment Groups
(ETG) software (Version 6) to group claims into episodes
of care
b. The program creates episodes by grouping clinic-
ally related services delivered to a patient for a given condi-
tion over a defined period of time, demarcated by “clean
periods” of no service use for acute conditions, or by calen-
dar years for chronic conditions. Although not developed
specifically for Medicare, the limitations of using the
Symmetry ETG grouper for a Medicare population are not
particularly relevant to the three conditions we investigated
and should be consistent across geographic areas [14].
We limited the sample to episodes that occurred in
2006 in order to use 2004–2005 claims to construct
measures of episodes in prior years, coexisting medical
conditions, and lagged information about local area diag-
nosis propensities and Medicare reimbursement rates.
Episodes that started before January 1, 2006 or were still
in progress by December 31, 2006 were eliminated from
the analysis, regardless of their length. (Since episode start
and end dates should be randomly distributed throughout
the calendar year, this should not create any bias in the
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to episodes treated either by a relevant specialist or by
a primary care physician (86.7% of cataract episodes,
91.3% of knee degeneration episodes, and 98.2% of benign
prostatic neoplasm episodes). Episodes were attributed to
the physician of either specialty who provided the most
services for that particular episode.
Dependent Variables
We constructed two dependent variables for each con-
dition: whether surgery occurred during the episode and
the total cost of the episode. Surgery was defined based
on the presence of relevant surgical codes in the claims
data. Total cost was calculated from the specific services
assigned to the episode by the grouper after eliminating
various adjustments the Medicare program makes to
determine the amount it pays for each service. We con-
structed this measure of the “standardized” cost by:
 incorporating the full reimbursement from all payers
(Medicare, patient cost sharing, and other insurers);
 eliminating geographic payment differences that
account for local input price variation;
 eliminating differential payments for identical
services across classes of providers (e.g. cost-based
reimbursement for critical access hospitals vs.
DRG-based payment for most hospitals); and
 distributing provider-specific special payments (e.g.,
disproportionate share and graduate medical
education payments) across all hospitals.
(The Appendix describes details of the construction of
the standardized cost variable).
Independent variables
Independent variables measure personal and market
characteristics that represent both the demand for care
for each of the conditions as well as the supplies of
relevant specialist and generalist physicians. The demand
for care depends on the person’s health characteristics, in-
come, and the ease/convenience (time price) of obtaining
care. The supply of care to Medicare beneficiaries depends
on the availability of both substitute and complementary
resources, and the level of demand from people with other
types of insurance coverage. Supply also depends on
Medicare payment rates and on input prices, which are
proxied by geographic fixed effects represented by dummy
variables for each of the sixty CTS communities
c.
Personal characteristics
To control for patients’ heterogeneous health states
(casemix) at the time of treatment, all models include
an extensive set of variables measuring individual patients’
co-existing health conditions drawn from the Hierarchical
Condition Category (HCC) model [15]. Because we used
standardized cost, not Medicare payment in our analysis,
use of a single HCC score based on CMS weights (which
change annually) would not be appropriate. Moreover, we
chose to use concurrent casemix adjustment instead of
prospective risk adjustment because the goal of this
analysis is to investigate variations in current costs, not
to predict future costs. Therefore, we included all of
the variables used by the HCC model as regressors.
(See Appendix). The HCC variables are those used by
CMS at the time of our data—in 2006—and do not regu-
larly change. We did not differentiate between community-
based and institutionalized beneficiaries, as CMS risk
adjustment does, because identification of institutionalized
persons is not readily available in claims.
We also constructed dichotomous variables that meas-
ure whether the beneficiary had been treated for the par-
ticular study condition in prior years: no prior episodes in
2004 and 2005, episodes in both prior years, or in one or
the other prior year. Interpretation of these variables is
ambiguous because they could represent either long-term
monitoring of a condition diagnosed relatively early in its
clinical progression, or post-treatment monitoring of
cases that have already received aggressive treatment.
Family income was imputed from a regression model
estimated with data for elderly Medicare beneficiaries who
responded to the 2003 CTS Household Survey [16]. The
regression model, which is reported in Appendix, estimated
self-reported income as a function of beneficiary age, gen-
der, race, and population characteristics of the beneficiary’s
zip code. We also include an indicator of whether the
person was covered by Medicaid. Beneficiaries covered by
Medicaid generally are not liable for any Medicare cost
sharing. However, Medicaid programs in some states do
not pay the full cost-sharing amount allowed by Medicare,
so the potential effect of Medicaid coverage is ambiguous.
Market characteristics
These variables were defined for the county of the patient’s
attributed physician because the attributed physician’s treat-
ment decisions are most likely influenced by conditions in
his/her local market, rather than the beneficiary’sc o u n t yo f
residence. Potential competition from other physicians is
measured by the numbers of physicians per 1,000 people in
the specialty most closely associated with each of the study
conditions (urology, orthopedic surgery, ophthalmology)
per 1,000 people and in primary care practice (PCP). We
hypothesize that the greater the availability of specialists,
the more likely a person is to be treated by a specialist,
which could be associated with a higher probability of sur-
gery and a higher total cost per episode. Conversely, greater
availability of PCPs could be associated with less frequent
surgery and lower costs.
Hadley et al. Health Economics Review 2014, 4:8 Page 3 of 19
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/8Since surgical treatment is one of the dependent vari-
ables, we include measures of hospital bed capacity (in
the prostate and knee models) and ambulatory surgery
center capacity (in the cataract and prostate models) per
1,000 people. We expect these to have positive associations
with the likelihood of surgery and with total cost.
Medicare reimbursement rates have been shown to in-
fluence the supply of services. Prior studies have focused
on whether the supply curve for physicians’ services is
upward sloping, as predicted by standard economic theory,
or backward bending, as would be predicted if income
effects dominated. Although results are not entirely
consistent, studies that tend to follow the comprehensive
theoretical model developed by McGuire and Pauly [16],
which allows for both types of behavior, were more likely
to find a positive relationship between Medicare fees and
the quantity of services provided to Medicare beneficiaries,
though not necessarily across all types of services, special-
ties, or local practice situations [17-22].
Several earlier studies incorporating elements of the
McGuire-Pauly model focused on Medicare supply re-
sponses to reductions in Medicare payments for selected
services in the late 1980s. Escarce estimated an upward
sloping supply response for services provided by physicians
in five affected specialties, but mixed results in another study
of eleven common surgical procedures [23,24]. Mitchell and
Cromwell also found that results varied across specific sur-
gical procedures, while Yip found that physicians whose
incomes were most affected by lower Medicare fees for
CABG did in fact increase their procedure volume [25,26].
In contrast, studies not based on the McGuire-Pauly
framework found that Medicare fee changes either had no
impact on volume or had an inverse relationship, i.e., supply
increased in response to fee reductions [27,28]. Similarly,
three earlier studies looking at associations between a 1977
Medicare fee change in Colorado and physicians’ Medicare
service volume also found inverse relationships [29-31].
Differences in Medicare fees for similar services may
also affect Medicare payments because of upcoding, i.e.,
billing for a more intensive level of care than what was
actually supplied [32,33]. However, this type of behavior
should not influence whether surgery was done unless it
encourages outright fraud. Therefore, the consistency of
the associations between relative Medicare fees and both
the likelihood of surgery and the cost per episode will
help interpret whether differences in costs are due only
to upcoding or potentially also reflect differences in how
episodes are treated.
We constructed a variable measuring relative Medicare
reimbursement for physicians’ services as the ratio of
average physician reimbursements for all surgical episodes
to average physician reimbursements for all non-surgical
episodes in the county in the two prior years (2004 and
2005). We hypothesize that this variable is a proxy for the
relative amount of reimbursement a treating physician
would expect to receive in 2006 for treating an average
surgical case relative to an average non-surgical case. We
used the county as the unit of geography rather than the
Medicare payment area in order to capture variations in
expected payment associated with variations in local treat-
ment patterns. In effect, we assume that the average mix
of services used to treat an episode is predetermined and
that the physician’s decision is influenced by the expected
payment for the local mix of services.
We recognize that this variable may be endogenous be-
cause it combines exogenous Medicare fees for individual
services with average local treatment patterns. For example,
physicians who have a preference for surgical treatment
may choose a more expensive surgical procedure or may
provide additional ancillary services in order to increase
Medicare reimbursement for a surgical episode. If physi-
cians with similar preferences tend to cluster in particular
geographic areas, then the ratio of payments for surgical to
non-surgical episodes may be positively correlated with the
likelihood of surgery because of physicians’ preferences
and their ability to influence reimbursement by selecting
the mix of services that make up an episode of care.
To investigate this possible source of endogeneity bias
we grouped counties into quartiles based on the ratio of
the average Medicare payment per episode for surgical
and non-surgical episodes of care, and compared the mixes
of specific services provided in the 1
st and 4
th quartiles of
counties. As shown in Appendix for cataract episodes, the
mix of services for surgical episodes were generally similar
in the two sets of areas. In fact, episodes in the counties in
the lowest quartile of the payment ratio variable had some-
what greater percentages of higher cost services. Moreover,
Medicare payments for both surgical and non-surgical
episodes were higher in the counties in the 1
st quartile of
the payment ratio than in the 4
th quartile counties, and
the ratio of fees for specific services was not uniform,
r a n g i n gf r o m1 . 4 3t o1 . 0 0f o rt h es u r g i c a le p i s o d e s .
(Similar comparisons for non-surgical episodes showed that
relative fees range from 1.35 to 1.12). Although this com-
parison does not provide clear evidence of a more expen-
sive mix of services in areas with a high ratio of Medicare
payments for surgical episodes compared to non-surgical
episodes, we nonetheless test for possible endogeneity
bias in the empirical estimation.
Early diagnosis of a condition can affect treatment de-
cisions and episode cost if it is associated with a period
of waiting for a condition to progress to the point when
surgical treatment is appropriate. To control for this
effect, we constructed measures of the local “propensity”
to diagnose each condition. We first estimated a re-
gression model of the probability of having an episode
of a study condition over the full sample of Medicare
beneficiaries over all three years as a function of age,
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the percentage of people in each county who should
have the condition if the national rate of diagnosis,
based on age, sex, and race, prevailed. We defined
diagnosis propensity as the difference between the pre-
dicted and actual percentages of beneficiaries with
each condition in the county.
Two additional market variables control for possible
“spillover” effects of local market structure. One is the per-
centage of the Medicare population enrolled in Medicare
Advantage plans in 2005. This could have either a positive
or a negative effect on surgery and cost per episode de-
pending on whether healthier beneficiaries select into
Medicare Advantage or if the presence of Medicare
Advantage plans induces less resource-intensive care
in the local market. The second spillover variable is
the percentage of the county population without
health insurance
d. We hypothesize that a high per-
centage uninsured increases physicians’ incentives to
provide more services to Medicare beneficiaries. Fi-
nally, to control for unobserved variations in local in-
put prices and market structure, all models include
dummy variables to control for the specific CTS site
and the local county’s position along the urban–rural
continuum based on population size and proximity to
a metropolitan statistical area.
Statistical estimation
We estimated logistic regressions for the likelihood of
surgery and linear regressions for standardized cost per
episode. We also conducted two sensitivity tests to as-
sess the robustness of the estimated Medicare reim-
bursement effect and its correlation with other variables
in the model. First, we estimated the models excluding
the Medicare reimbursement variable to assess whether
the coefficients of the other key variables were sensitive to
its inclusion. Second, we estimated the models limiting
the sample to beneficiaries in counties that had at least
ten surgical episodes in the prior time period, because
the value of the reimbursement variable might be un-
stable if based on only a few surgical episodes in the coun-
ty
e. These models did not show substantive changes in the
values of the parameter estimates, so we present results
for the full sample.
We indicate the magnitudes of the associations between
the key policy variables and the dependent variables by
calculating elasticities from the cost models and marginal
probabilities from the logistic models. Marginal probabil-
ities were calculated by using thel o g i s t i cr e g r e s s i o nm o d e l s
to predict the probability of a surgical episode first at the
actual values of all of the independent variables, and then
after increasing the values of the key policy variables by
10% in separate simulations.
Results
Descriptive characteristics
The final sample included 368,473 cataract episodes,
84,299 episodes of benign prostatic neoplasm, and 88,102
episodes of knee degeneration (Table 1). The percentage of
surgical episodes ranges from 7.0% for benign prostatic
neoplasm to 17.9% for cataracts. Average cost per episode
for cataracts ($581.71) and benign prostatic neoplasm
($559.14) are fairly similar, but is much higher for knee de-
generation ($3,260.03), and cost per episode is much higher
for surgical than for non-surgical episodes (e.g., $2,711 vs.
$118 for cataracts). The ratio of surgical to non-surgical
Medicare physician payments per episode ranges from 9.66
(knee degeneration) to 13.36 (benign prostatic neoplasm).
Area characteristics are similar across the three conditions.
Figure 1a and b compare the cost per episode and the
percent of episodes treated surgically across areas (CTS sites)
grouped into quintiles using two alternative ranking criteria:
average total standardized Medicare cost per beneficiary for
all care received (blue bars) and average standardized Medi-
care cost per episode for each of the three study conditions
(red bars). When the sites are ranked by average total cost
per beneficiary, there is little variation across quintiles in ei-
ther cost per episode or the percentage of episodes treated
surgically, and no discernible relationship between the aver-
age total cost per beneficiary and the cost per episode.
A very different picture emerges when sites are grouped
into quintiles based on cost per episode for each condi-
tion. Cost per episode ranges from 45% to 63% higher in
the fifth quintile compared to the first and the percentage
of episodes treated surgically follows a very similar pattern,
suggesting that the proportion treated surgically is a key
driver of cost per episode.
Regression results
To assess possible endogeneity bias of the lagged relative
Medicare physician payment for surgical and non-surgical
episodes, we conducted a Hausman-Wu test for each of
the linear cost models [34]
f. The exogenous identifying
variable used to execute the test was the difference be-
tween the actual Medicare payment per relative value
unit (RVU) for a typical service and a hypothetical payment
per RVU that eliminates policy adjustments in the
Medicare payment formula and uses more accurate local
measures of input costs. This variable, constructed at the
county level in another study [22], reflects the implicit
profit per RVU due to deviations between Medicare’sa c t u a l
payment rates and the estimated cost of a RVU.
The Hausman-Wu test rejected the presence of endo-
geneity bias in the models for benign prostatic neoplasm
and knee degeneration, but failed to reject in the model
for cataract episodes. We investigated instrumental variable
estimation of the cataract model, but the resulting coef-
ficient estimate had an extremely large standard error,
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variable is a generic measure of profit per RVU rather
than specific to payments for cataract services. Thus, the
OLS parameter estimate of the relative Medicare physician
payment variable in the cataract episode model may be
subject to endogeneity bias.
Table 1 Mean values of dependent and selected independent variables, by condition
Variable Cataract Knee degeneration Benign neoplasm of the prostate
EPISODE CHARACTERISTICS
Number of episodes 368,473 88,102 84,299
Pct. surgical episodes 17.90 14.03 6.99
(14.5-22.9) (9.2-19.7) (4.0-10.2)
Cost per episode ($)
All episodes 581.71 3,260.03 559.14
(492–724) (2,326-4,172) (410–711)
Non-surgical episodes 117.53 554.34 239.40
(107–128) (452–666) (195–294)
Surgical episodes 2,710.97 19,834.43 4,811.77
(2,494-2,984) (15,580-22,670) (4,323-5,507)
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
Ratio of Medicare physician payment per episode
for surgical and non-surgical episodes
10.81 9.66 13.36
(9.6-12.0) (8.6-10.6) (10.2-17.1)
Primary care practitioners per 1,000 pop. 0.77 0.81 0.78
(0.52-1.01) (0.53-1.07) (0.51-1.05)
Relevant specialists per 1,000 pop. 0.08 0.10 0.05
(0.04-0.11) (0.06-0.14) (0.02-0.06)
Ambulatory surgery center capacity per 1,000 pop. 0.05 – 0.05
(0.02-0.08) (0.02-0.09)
Hospital beds per 1,000 pop. – 4.66 4.75
(2.9-6.5) (2.8-7.3)
Pct. Medicare pop. enrolled in Medicare advantage plans 12.14 12.73 13.49
(0.1-35.6) (0.2-35.9) (0.2-35.9)
Pct. of the nonelderly pop. uninsured 16.26 16.28 16.60
(10.9-22.9) (10.9-22.9) (10.7-23.6)
Diagnosis propensity (difference between actual and
predicted proportion with diagnosis)
0.09 0.02 0.05
(0.01-0.13) (0.001-0.03) (−0.001-0.08)
BENEFICIARY CHARACTERISTICS
Family income ($1000 s) 40.89 40.31 52.07
(26.0-56.1) (25.1-54.4) (32.5-70.6)
Pct. with medicaid coverage 7.64 8.83 4.80
(2.9-20.4) (3.5-18.8) (1.1-14.9)
Pct. with episodes in prior years
2004 & 2005 30.37 17.60 35.00
(23.5-35.0) (13.3-21.9) (22.8-44.0)
2005 only 22.19 22.93 21.33
(20.4-23.7) (19.7-26.0) (18.2-23.7)
2004 only 13.92 10.59 9.79
(12.3-16.2) (8.2-12.6) (6.5-12.5)
(Site-level range between 10
th-90
th percentiles in parentheses).
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gical episode) and OLS coefficients (standardized cost
per episode) from the regression models for selected
variables. (Complete regression results for one of the
conditions are reported in Appendix). Two sets of
results are presented for each condition, one with the
relative Medicare physician payment variable and one
without.
Focusing first on the results for the probability of sur-
gery, excluding relative Medicare payment from the
models for knee degeneration and benign prostatic neo-
plasm has very little effect on the magnitudes of the
other variables’ odds ratios, suggesting very little cor-
relation with the other independent variables. How-
ever, the odds ratios in the cataract episode models
show a greater sensitivity to excluding the Medicare
payment variable.
The two measures of market demand characteristics,
the percentage of the population without insurance and
the percentage enrolled in a Medicare HMO, have no
significant effect on the odds of a surgical episode for knee
degeneration, but have generally significant but opposite
associations with the other two conditions. In areas with
large uninsured populations Medicare beneficiaries with
cataract or a benign prostatic neoplasm are more likely to
have a surgical episode. However, in areas with greater
Medicare HMO enrollment, the odds of a surgical episode
are lower. Family income, which is measured at the bene-
ficiary level, has a consistently negative association with
the odds of a surgical episode. This association could re-
flect either that higher income patients are diagnosed earl-
ier in the course of their condition before surgical
treatment is required, or that they had surgery more
promptly (in an earlier year) than lower income people
and were observed during a post-surgical episode. Having
Medicaid coverage has a positive association with the
probability of surgical treatment for cataracts and benign
prostatic neoplasm, but a negative association with surgi-
cal treatment of knee degeneration.
The variable measuring county diagnosis propensity
has similar associations with cataract and benign
prostatic neoplasm, but an opposite association with
knee degeneration episodes. For the latter, a high
county-level diagnosis propensity is associated with a
greater likelihood of a surgical episode. For the other
two conditions, a high diagnosis propensity is associ-
ated with a lower likelihood of a surgical episode,
suggesting that these conditions are diagnosed earlier
in their course.
Turning to the models for cost per episode, the pat-
tern of coefficient signs is very similar to those found
in the logistic models. Given the strong association be-
tween cost per episode and the likelihood of surgery
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Figure 1 Average cost per episode and percent surgical episodes by quintile site rankings for each condition. a. Average cost per
episode and b. Percent episodes treated by surgery.
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sult is not surprising. Levels of statistical significance
tend to be lower, however, especially in the models for
knee degeneration episodes. In particular, the number
of PCPs per 1,000 population is not statistically sig-
nificant, perhaps reflecting less substitutability between
PCPs and specialists in the care of knee degeneration
episodes.
Table 2 Regression results for probability of surgery and cost per episode
Selected independent variables Probability of surgery (Odds ratios) Cost per episode (Regression coefficients)
Cataract
Medicare physician payment ratio – 1.205 – 57.96
PCPs per 1000 pop. 0.730 0.665 −118.04 −147.99
Ophthalmologists per 1000 pop. 103.008 416.794 1927.73 2263.34
ASC capacity per 1000 pop. 18.115 12.998 731.66 559.47
Medicare HMO % 0.998 1.001 (.3) −1.27(.02) −0.87 (.10)
% Uninsured 1.030 1.036 9.77 11.74
Family income 0.998 0.998 −0.61 −0.59
County diagnosis propensity 0.574 0.343 −276.64 −521.37
Has Medicaid coverage 1.211 1.196 109.13 104.10
Episodes in 2005 & 2006 −0.262 −0.264 −151.81 −152.4
Episodes in 2004 & 2006 −0.375 −0.373 −215.27 −214.4
Episodes in 2004-2006 −0.461 −0.458 −237.47 −236.28
Knee degeneration
Medicare physician payment ratio – 1.048 – 115.57
PCPs per 1000 pop. 0.814 0.821 −204.87 (.22) −179.78 (.27)
Orthopedists per 1000 pop. 69.875 57.435 8608.65 8076.99
Hospital beds per 1000 pop. 0.981 0.979 −14.78 (.34) −18.75 (.22)
Medicare HMO % 1.000 (.87) 1.001 (.31) .67 (.92) 4.03 (.54)
% Uninsured 1.000 (.86) 1.003 (.29) −14.50 (.29) −8.32 (.54)
Family income 0.999 0.999 −2.67 (.02) −2.636 (.02)
County diagnosis propensity 44.411 33.347 5783.25 5122.99
Has Medicaid coverage 0.554 0.553 −1050.76 −1058.45
Episodes in 2005 & 2006 0.608 0.608 1465.48 1465.09
Episodes in 2004 & 2006 0.282 0.282 492.64 492.75
Episodes in 2004-2006 0.315 0.315 681.79 681.77
Benign neoplasm of the prostate
Medicare physician payment ratio – 1.022 – 8.57
PCPs per 1000 pop. 0.565 0.545 −174.1 −191.45
Urologists per 1000 pop. 372.571 595.574 2507.85 2720.77
Hospital beds per 1000 pop. 0.966 0.965 −15.59 −15.53
ASC capacity per 1000 pop. 6.910 8.129 573.2 647.11
Medicare HMO % 0.994 0.994 −1.48 (.25) −1.25 (.33)
% Uninsured 1.035 1.034 14.04 14.25
Family income 0.998 0.998 −0.52 −0.52
County diagnosis propensity 0.080 0.059 −775.55 −920.16
Has medicaid coverage 1.432 1.436 231.25 232.14
Episodes in 2005 & 2006 −0.192 −0.193 −121.28 −121.53
Episodes in 2004 & 2006 −0.158 −0.158 −113.88 −113.52
Episodes in 2004-2006 −0.618 −0.617 −231 −230.46
(All coefficients statistically significant at p< .01 unless otherwise indicated in parentheses).
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Table 3 summarizes the magnitudes of the associations
(based on the regression results reported in Table 2)
with the dependent variables for a 10% increase in the
magnitudes of variables potentially amenable to policy
intervention: primary care practitioners (PCPs) per 1,000
population, relevant specialists per 1,000 population, and
the relative Medicare physician payment for surgical
compared to non-surgical cases. (Although ambulatory
surgery center and hospital bed capacity were also statisti-
cally significant, their marginal effects were very small and
are not reported).
For all three conditions, a 10% greater supply of pri-
mary care physicians is associated with a lower likeli-
hood of surgery and lower cost per episode. For cataract
episodes, for example, a 10% greater PCP supply is asso-
ciated with 1.95% lower total cost per episode and 2.4%
fewer surgical episodes. Conversely, a 10% greater supply
of relevant specialists is associated with a higher total
cost per episode and a greater likelihood of surgery, and
this effect is generally larger than the association calcu-
lated for a change in PCP supply: estimated changes
span a relatively narrow band of 2.54% to 3.9% across
the three conditions.
Differences in Medicare physician reimbursement for
a surgical episode relative to a non-surgical episode cal-
culated at the county level are strongly associated with
both the likelihood of surgery and standardized cost per
episode. The physician payment ratio elasticity is largest
for cataract episodes, and very similar in magnitude for
knee degeneration and benign prostatic neoplasm epi-
sodes. A 10% higher level of physician reimbursement
for cataract surgery relative to reimbursement for a non-
surgical episode is associated with a higher surgical
probability, by 16.9%, and a higher cost per episode, by
10.8%. For the other two conditions, the percentage
increases associated with a 10% increase in physician
reimbursement for surgical episodes range from 2.1%
to 3.4%.
Discussion
Summary
Our study has several notable results. First, we find that
average total spending per beneficiary for all services was
not associated with cost per episode of the specific con-
ditions we examined, and that the frequency of surgical
versus non-surgical treatme n ti na na r e aw a ss t r o n g l y
associated with the overall cost of treating that particular
condition. Second, Medicare physician reimbursement for
surgical relative to non-surgical episodes of care and the
availability of specialists (ophthalmologists, urologists, and
orthopedists) both have statistically significant and quanti-
tatively meaningful positive associations with both the like-
lihood of surgical treatment and cost per episode. Third,
the availability of PCPs has a significant negative association
with both surgical treatment and cost, but the magnitude
of the effect on cost is somewhat smaller than that for spe-
cialists. These results both refine and extend earlier find-
ings of significant associations between the availabilities
and supplies of relevant specialists and PCPs on the
treatment and cost of particular conditions.
One potential explanation for some areas having a higher
likelihood of surgical treatment and corresponding higher
total costs per episode might relate to patterns of diagnosis
in an area. For instance, in some areas, PCPs or other phy-
sicians might commonly diagnose and follow cataracts
from their earliest stages, prior to the cataract compromis-
ing vision and requiring surgical treatment. In these areas,
the prevalence of cataract episodes might be higher, but
the average cost would be lower because surgery is re-
quired less frequently. In other parts of the country, this
diagnosis might not be made or noted in claims until the
condition has progressed and surgical options warrant con-
sideration. The likelihood of surgery may be higher in these
geographic areas because the cataract is diagnosed when
more advanced. Thus, even though some markets might
have higher rates of surgery and cost per episode, overall
treatment costs for the condition might be lower because
of the lower diagnostic propensity.
Table 3 Marginal probabilities and elasticities* of key policy variables: Percent change in dependent variable for a
10% increase in the independent variable
Cataract Knee degeneration Benign prostatic neoplasm
Percent surgical episodes (mean) 17.9% 14.0% 6.99%
PCPs per 1000 pop. −2.4% (−0.44%) −1.2% (−0.18%) −3.9% (−0.28%)
Relevant specialists per pop. 3.9 (0.7) 3.4 (0.48) 2.7 (0.18)
Medicare part B payment ratio 16.9 (3.04) 3.6 (0.51) 2.7 (0.19)
Cost per episode (mean) $581.71 $3,260.03 $559.14
PCPs per 1000 pop. −1.95% −0.45% −0.46%
Relevant specialists per 1000 pop. 3.00 2.54 3.90
Medicare part B payment ratio 10.77 3.42 2.05
*All calculated marginal probabilities and elasticities are based on coefficients that are statistically significant at p <.01. (See Table 2.)
(Absolute change in probability in parentheses).
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of diagnosis propensity to control for these effects. Not-
ably, the relationships identified were highly statistically
significant, but not consistent in direction across the
three conditions: a high propensity to diagnose was
negatively related to the probability of surgery and cost
per episode for cataracts and benign prostatic neoplasm,
but positively related to surgery and cost for knee de-
generation. The reasons for these differences are not
apparent, suggesting that analysis of variations in diagnosis
propensity across areas and conditions should be a topic
for future research.
Our analysis included variables measuring the availabil-
ity of PCPs and specialists located the same county as the
attributed physician, but excluded the actual specialty of
the attributed physician. The decision to be treated by a
specialist rather than a PCP very likely reflects differences
in underlying severity of the condition that cannot be ob-
served with claims data. Therefore, this analysis cannot re-
veal the mechanism through which greater PCP availability
m a ya f f e c tt h et r e a t m e n to ft h e s ee p i s o d e s .O n ep o s s i b i l i t y
is that greater availability of PCPs results in greater PCP in-
volvement with these episodes before seeking a specialist’s
opinion. This could influence whether and when surgical
treatment is recommended. For example, PCPs’ involve-
ment in episodes of knee degeneration and benign prostatic
neoplasm may lead to more conservative treatment that
emphasizes non-surgical interventions before concluding
that surgery is needed.
We find that higher average Medicare physician pay-
ments for surgical episodes compared to non-surgical
episodes are associated with a significantly greater likeli-
hood of having a surgical episode and a higher average
cost per episode. For knee degeneration and benign
prostate episodes, this variable does not appear to be
correlated with the supplies of relevant specialists or of
PCPs. Thus, our findings are consistent with several
earlier empirical studies that show that, at the margin,
financial incentives to physicians lead to higher utilization
of services. In this case, the higher relative reimbursement
in these counties may lead to somewhat earlier and more
frequent interventions for these conditions that could
be treated either conservatively (without surgery) or more
aggressively (with surgery).
The estimated effects of the relative payment variable
are much larger for cataract episodes, and there is also
stronger evidence of correlations with the supplies of
physicians. Although these estimates may overstate the
magnitude of the true relationship because of possible
endogeneity bias, they are consistent with an earlier study
of the effects of Medicare payments for cataract surgery,
which found that a 10% increase in payment rates for
cataract surgery increased the number of cataract surger-
ies performed by ophthalmologists by 11.5% [18].
Limitations
This study has a number of important limitations. It is
a cross-sectional analysis containing both supply and
demand factors. Coefficients represent associations, not
causal relationships between the dependent variables
and relative Medicare reimbursements, specialty avail-
ability, and PCP availability. With respect to the relative
Medicare reimbursement variable, the Hausman-Wu
test suggests that it is likely endogenous in the case of
cataracts, implying that relative Medicare reimbursement
for surgery may be higher in areas where physicians perform
more surgery because those physicians may be able to ma-
nipulate reimbursement rates to their advantage. Similarly,
physicians with a preference for surgical intervention may
choose to locate in areas where surgery is performed more
frequently for some other reason we do not observe.
Future analyses should attempt to treat both reimburse-
ment rates and physician supply as potentially jointly
determined with cost per episode and the probability of
surgery in order to untangle the direction of causation.
Another limitation is that we investigate only three
specific conditions. Therefore, our results do not generalize
to all types of conditions and other specialties. Finally, while
this analysis suggests how policy might influence the choice
of treatment and episode cost, it does not address at all the
potential benefits associated with earlier or more aggressive
surgical treatment. Comparative effectiveness research is
needed to address these questions.
Conclusions
Although the cross-sectional structure of the analysis and
the existence of potential endogeneity bias warrant caution
in developing policy recommendations, we offer three ten-
tative policy implications. First, efforts to alter the specialty
mix of physicians by encouraging the expansion of primary
care and discouraging entry into the specialties represented
in this analysis could eventually affect the cost of treating
t h e s ee p i s o d e sb yr e d u c i n gt h elikelihood of surgical treat-
ment. Moreover, policy should focus more precisely on the
supplies of individual specialties thought to be associated
with the over-provision of specific services in some areas,
rather than on the supplies of broad categories of special-
ists, i.e., all surgical specialists or all medical specialists.
Second, modifying Medicare reimbursement rates for
surgical procedures is another potential avenue for influ-
encing the likelihood of surgical treatment and cost per
episode. If it is believed that there is too much surgery, i.e.,
too many cases that do not benefit from surgery, then
lowering Medicare payment rates for those procedures
should reduce their volume and the average cost of treat-
ing episodes for these conditions.
Third, a policy focused on altering relative reimbursement
rates for specific procedures has the advantage of rapid im-
plementation and could affect all practitioners regardless of
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and changes in Medicare relative payment rates have similar
quantitative effects (Table 2), the cost and speed of imple-
menting a change in reimbursement policy are much lower
and faster than trying to use policy to change the relative
supplies (and locations) of physicians in different specialties.
Although evidence is limited on how such reimburse-
ment policies would affect treatment decisions, two stud-
ies of physicians’ responses to reductions in Medicare
payment rates for treatment of prostate cancer patients
found that physicians maintained treatment for clinically
appropriate cases and reduced it for less appropriate cases
[35,36]. Nonetheless, close and continuous monitoring of
the effects on quality of changes in reimbursement rates is
clearly important.
In conclusion, this analysis suggests that the choice of sur-
gical treatment and cost per episode of care are associated
with both market characteristics and relative reimbursement
rates. However, the effects do not appear to be uniform
across conditions or similar for all conditions across market
areas. Therefore, policymakers would benefit from more
clinically nuanced research studies that focus on specific
conditions rather than on all medical care in general.
Endnotes
aCenter for Studying Health Systems Change. CTS Phys-
ician Surveys Details of the survey are available at http://
www.hschange.org/index.cgi?data=04.
bIngenix, Eden Prairie, MN.
cAlthough Medicare uses a fee schedule to pay providers
uniform prices, imperfections in RVU assignments, geo-
graphic adjustments for local input prices, and other factors
result in variations in effective fees levels across areas [22].
dU. S. Census Bureau, “2007 Health Insurance Coverage
Status for Counties and States: Data Sets.” http://www.
census.gov/did/www/sahie/data/20052007/index.html.
eIn the full sample, cases in counties with fewer than 10
surgical episodes were assigned the CTS site-level value
of this variable. The choice of 10 surgical episodes as the
threshold for segmenting the sample is based on the
observation that approximately half of the counties across
the three conditions had fewer than 10 surgeries. How-
ever, these counties account for less than 5% of the total
cases in the analysis.
fEndogeneity bias is less likely in the surgery models be-
cause the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator
that should be relatively insensitive to the mix of services
provided to surgical and non-surgical episodes.
Appendix
The Appendix provides additional information about the
construction of the dependent variable measuring the
standardized cost per episode for each of the three condi-
tions analyzed. Supplementary tables present the complete
regression models with all independent variables for one
of the conditions analyzed (knee degeneration), the regres-
sion model used to impute family income, and a compari-
son of the detailed service mix for cataract episodes in
counties with high and low ratios of average Medicare
payment for surgical and non-surgical cataract episodes of
care.
Construction of the “Standardized” cost per
episode
This appendix describes the construction of the “stan-
dardized” cost measure used as the dependent variable
in the analysis of cost per episode. The Medicare pro-
gram bases its payments on a complex system of admin-
istered prices that in principle are designed to reflect the
cost of local inputs, though in reality are modified to
achieve other policy objectives. Our methods build upon
and adapt procedures used by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services in their development of resource
use reports and MedPAC (2003). A key distinction be-
tween our measure of “standardized” cost and Medicare
payments is that we measure total payments to providers
for Medicare covered services rendered to Medicare bene-
ficiaries, including not only payments from the Medicare
trust funds, but also patient cost sharing and payments by
other insurers. For instance, in the context of physician ser-
vices, we base standardized costs on the total allowed charge
for a given service, rather than j u s tt h eM e d i c a r ep a y m e n t .
General adjustments
Adjustments in payment based on the geographic
location that service takes place
For nearly all types of services, Medicare adjusts pay-
ment levels to reflect local geographic variations in input
prices such as labor, real estate costs, and other inputs
to the production of medical services. In some cases,
there are special rules that provide extra payment for
rural providers and those who practice in designated
provider shortage areas. Finally, for Part B services, some
services are priced by Carriers. In constructing standard-
ized prices we eliminate all of these geographic-based pay-
ment differences so that, for instance, a given service
provided in New York City will receive the same standard-
ized cost as one provided in rural Kansas, where wages
and other input prices are generally less expensive.
Adjustments in payments associated with different
payment systems within a given class of providers
In some instances, Medicare payment policy identifies
certain classes of providers for whom there are different
payment systems than the norm. For example, while
most short-term hospitals are paid prospectively on a
DRG basis, rural Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) are
paid retrospectively on a cost basis. Moreover, Maryland
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Likelihood of a Surgical Episode Cost per Episode
w/ Medicare w/o Medicare w/ Medicare w/o Medicare
Label Odds
Ratio
Pr>chi-
sq
Odds
Ratio
Pr>chi-
sq
Param. Pr >
/t/
Param. Pr >
/t/
Intercept <.01 <.01 263.75 0.69 1481.86 0.01
Medicare relative payment 1.048 <.01 115.57 0.00
Total hospital beds per 1,000 pop. 0.979 <.01 0.981 <.01 −18.75 0.22 −14.78 0.34
Medicare advantage % 1.001 0.31 1 0.88 4.03 0.54 0.67 0.92
Percent uninsured 1.003 0.29 1 0.85 −8.32 0.54 −14.50 0.29
Predicted family income, $1,000 0.999 <.01 0.999 <.01 −2.64 0.02 −2.67 0.02
PCPs per 1,000 pop 0.821 <.01 0.814 <.01 −179.78 0.27 −204.87 0.21
Orthopedic Surgeons per 1,000 pop 57.435 <.01 69.785 <.01 8076.99 <.01 8608.65 <.01
Knee diagnosis propensity 33.347 <.01 44.411 <.01 5122.99 0.00 5783.25 0.00
Knee in 2006 & 2005 1.837 <.01 1.837 <.01 1465.09 <.01 1465.48 <.01
Knee in 2006 & 2004 1.326 <.01 1.326 <.01 492.75 <.01 492.64 <.01
Knee in all 3 years 1.37 <.01 1.37 <.01 681.77 <.01 681.79 <.01
250,000 to 1 million pop. 1.113 <.01 1.101 <.01 248.86 0.16 218.53 0.22
Fewer than 250,000 pop. 1.092 0.01 1.018 0.60 −21.05 0.91 −178.17 0.33
Urban pop 20,000+, adjacent metro area 0.828 <.01 0.843 <.01 −515.46 0.01 −472.31 0.02
Urban pop 20,000+, not adjacent metro area 0.841 <.01 0.807 <.01 −804.99 0.00 −899.08 0.00
Completely rural or <20,000 urban pop, adjacent to a metro
area
0.599 <.01 0.618 <.01 −1086.23 <.01 −1012.13 <.01
Completely rural or <20,000 urban pop, not adjacent to a
metro area
0.835 <.01 0.841 <.01 −421.66 0.17 −390.97 0.20
Boston 1.999 <.01 1.977 <.01 459.11 0.30 424.87 0.33
Cleveland 1.862 <.01 1.844 <.01 −68.19 0.86 −92.57 0.81
Greenville 1.875 <.01 1.824 <.01 270.05 0.53 225.93 0.60
Indianapolis 2.289 <.01 2.331 <.01 481.85 0.28 521.84 0.24
Lansing 4.335 <.01 4.167 <.01 1743.84 0.00 1661.43 0.00
Little Rock 3.353 <.01 3.439 <.01 2073.97 <.01 2150.04 <.01
Newark 1.695 <.01 1.626 <.01 962.48 0.03 863.51 0.05
Orange Country 1.553 <.01 1.519 <.01 441.55 0.23 385.74 0.29
Phoenix 2.615 <.01 2.66 <.01 1245.15 0.00 1286.09 <.01
Seattle 4.234 <.01 4.1 <.01 1926.81 <.01 1843.13 <.01
Syracuse 1.866 <.01 1.816 <.01 196.01 0.67 137.73 0.77
Atlanta 1.926 <.01 1.841 <.01 439.34 0.29 331.66 0.43
Augusta 1.64 <.01 1.613 <.01 −105.73 0.82 −141.47 0.76
Baltimore 2.499 <.01 2.393 <.01 1444.44 0.00 1341.52 0.00
Bridgeport 1.783 <.01 1.74 <.01 492.16 0.27 440.17 0.33
Chicago 2.211 <.01 2.242 <.01 1086.10 0.01 1123.08 0.01
Columbus 1.524 <.01 1.55 <.01 −170.76 0.69 −127.22 0.77
Denver 2.251 <.01 2.323 <.01 782.53 0.03 860.28 0.02
Detroit 2.612 <.01 2.521 <.01 1042.65 0.02 965.72 0.03
Greensboro 2.366 <.01 2.34 <.01 737.38 0.06 713.82 0.06
Houston 2.297 <.01 2.387 <.01 769.28 0.05 871.75 0.02
Huntington 3.268 <.01 3.301 <.01 1215.06 0.01 1253.16 0.01
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Killeen 1.061 0.59 1.218 0.07 −1071.01 0.02 −731.35 0.12
Knoxville 2.539 <.01 2.529 <.01 732.56 0.08 735.08 0.08
Las Vegas 2.538 <.01 2.644 <.01 1681.40 <.01 1782.93 <.01
Los Angeles 1.979 <.01 1.963 <.01 698.34 0.01 679.55 0.02
Middlesex 1.516 <.01 1.546 <.01 224.06 0.59 263.60 0.53
Milwaukee 2.711 <.01 2.671 <.01 928.57 0.04 895.44 0.05
Minneapolis 4.178 <.01 4.177 <.01 1422.31 0.00 1414.78 0.00
Modesto 3.488 <.01 3.802 <.01 1289.36 0.01 1502.17 0.00
Nassau 1.637 <.01 1.532 <.01 717.10 0.06 556.12 0.15
New York City 1.139 0.19 1.061 0.55 186.82 0.64 −13.89 0.97
Philadelphia 1.912 <.01 1.869 <.01 565.01 0.14 503.24 0.19
Pittsburgh 1.879 <.01 2.009 <.01 392.91 0.31 544.60 0.16
Portland 2.578 <.01 2.774 <.01 620.25 0.13 790.23 0.05
Riverside 2.819 <.01 2.929 <.01 1537.83 <.01 1634.94 <.01
Rochester 2.027 <.01 2.107 <.01 235.60 0.55 319.40 0.42
San Antonio 2.063 <.01 2.147 <.01 659.56 0.09 758.39 0.05
San Francisco 1.654 <.01 1.713 <.01 −346.54 0.39 −267.43 0.51
Santa Rosa 1.5 <.01 1.554 <.01 −245.71 0.55 −154.53 0.70
Shreveport 1.612 <.01 1.598 <.01 3.19 0.99 −8.20 0.99
St. Louis 3.115 <.01 3.05 <.01 1095.28 0.01 1045.82 0.01
Tampa 3.074 <.01 3.156 <.01 1547.16 <.01 1613.21 <.01
Tulsa 3.637 <.01 3.587 <.01 1648.34 0.00 1618.42 0.00
Washington DC 2.247 <.01 2.117 <.01 833.68 0.04 691.44 0.09
W Palm Beach 1.299 <.01 1.258 <.01 107.93 0.73 33.26 0.91
Worcester 1.426 <.01 1.441 <.01 −279.29 0.56 −259.90 0.59
Dothan 1.252 0.03 1.235 0.05 −0.29 1.00 −47.74 0.92
Terre Haute 1.936 <.01 1.948 <.01 689.23 0.17 635.20 0.20
Wilmington 2.695 <.01 2.631 <.01 1286.99 0.00 1238.71 0.00
W-Cen Alabama 5.728 <.01 5.735 <.01 1912.34 0.62 1917.45 0.62
Cen Arkansas 2.858 <.01 2.911 <.01 1460.14 0.00 1512.32 0.00
N Georgia 2.651 <.01 2.61 <.01 1258.66 0.00 1224.33 0.00
NE Illinois 4.713 <.01 4.993 <.01 2024.37 <.01 2185.34 <.01
NE Indiana 2.523 <.01 2.406 <.01 844.72 0.11 738.15 0.16
E Maine 4.272 <.01 4.149 <.01 2005.49 <.01 1935.89 <.01
E North Car 2.774 <.01 2.856 <.01 1440.15 0.00 1517.89 0.00
N Utah 3.588 <.01 3.746 <.01 2207.68 <.01 2297.29 <.01
NW Washington 5.126 <.01 4.948 <.01 2571.48 <.01 2483.29 <.01
Female, 70-74 0.869 <.01 0.868 <.01 −398.46 <.01 −398.37 <.01
Female, 75-79 0.77 <.01 0.77 <.01 −600.39 <.01 −600.47 <.01
Female, 80-84 0.604 <.01 0.604 <.01 −1092.32 <.01 −1094.17 <.01
Female, 85-89 0.301 <.01 0.3 <.01 −1923.30 <.01 −1927.73 <.01
Female, 90-94 0.081 <.01 0.081 <.01 −2879.62 <.01 −2878.14 <.01
Female, 95+ 0.086 <.01 0.086 <.01 −2583.31 <.01 −2584.45 <.01
Male, 65-69 1.086 <.01 1.087 <.01 177.61 0.10 179.50 0.09
Male, 70-74 0.957 0.02 0.957 0.02 −242.75 0.02 −241.39 0.02
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Male, 75-79 0.826 <.01 0.827 <.01 −446.79 <.01 −444.44 <.01
Male, 80-84 0.591 <.01 0.592 <.01 −1153.62 <.01 −1152.08 <.01
Male, 85-89 0.34 <.01 0.34 <.01 −2078.91 <.01 −2078.07 <.01
Male, 90-94 0.084 <.01 0.084 <.01 −2993.29 <.01 −2990.22 <.01
Male, 95+ 0.011 <.01 0.011 <.01 −3829.36 <.01 −3822.73 <.01
Female covered by Medicaid 1.327 <.01 1.328 <.01 501.49 0.02 506.88 0.02
Covered by Medicaid 0.554 <.01 0.553 <.01 −1050.76 <.01 −1058.45 <.01
Originally disabled dummy variable 0.844 <.01 0.842 <.01 −215.49 0.03 −219.15 0.03
Diabetes and congestive heart failure 1.003 0.93 1.003 0.93 −38.62 0.81 −37.29 0.82
Diabetes and cardiovascular disease 1.075 0.12 1.075 0.12 105.11 0.66 106.14 0.66
Congestive heart failure and COPD 0.495 <.01 0.496 <.01 −1754.30 <.01 −1752.41 <.01
COPD, cardiovascular disease, and coronary artery disease 0.675 <.01 0.674 <.01 −964.91 0.04 −968.02 0.04
Arthritis and congestive heart failure 0.878 0.02 0.877 0.01 −461.98 0.09 −465.22 0.09
Arthritis, congestive heart failure, and diabetes 0.835 <.01 0.835 <.01 −597.90 0.03 −599.91 0.03
HIV/AIDS 0.847 0.58 0.848 0.58 −1015.23 0.47 −1022.80 0.46
Septicemia/Shock 0.637 <.01 0.635 <.01 −686.78 0.01 −690.87 0.01
Opportunistic Infections 0.724 0.00 0.716 <.01 −543.88 0.31 −559.52 0.29
Metastatic Cancer and Acute Leukemia 0.487 <.01 0.486 <.01 −1506.89 <.01 −1509.66 <.01
Lung, Upper Digestive Tract, and Other Severe Cancers 0.661 <.01 0.66 <.01 −857.56 0.00 −863.01 0.00
Lymphatic, Head and Neck, Brain, and Other Major Cancers 0.761 <.01 0.761 <.01 −568.29 0.00 −568.29 0.00
Breast, Prostate, Colorectal and Other Cancers and Tumors 0.931 <.01 0.93 <.01 −144.57 0.06 −145.97 0.06
Diabetes with Renal or Peripheral Circulatory Manifestation 0.965 0.23 0.964 0.22 188.89 0.23 183.82 0.24
Diabetes with Neurologic or Other Specified Manifestation 1.061 0.03 1.06 0.03 230.57 0.12 229.68 0.12
Diabetes with Acute Complications 1.236 0.03 1.227 0.03 585.17 0.25 567.65 0.26
Diabetes with Ophthalmologic or Unspecified Manifestation 0.731 <.01 0.729 <.01 −487.34 0.01 −493.09 0.01
Diabetes without Complication 1.049 <.01 1.049 <.01 125.82 0.06 126.91 0.05
Protein-Calorie Malnutrition 1.642 <.01 1.638 <.01 1346.17 <.01 1345.01 <.01
End-Stage Liver Disease 1.05 0.64 1.053 0.63 525.14 0.37 530.48 0.36
Cirrhosis of Liver 0.978 0.80 0.975 0.78 291.17 0.53 279.44 0.55
Chronic Hepatitis 1.011 0.90 1.015 0.87 −47.26 0.92 −42.97 0.93
Intestinal Obstruction/Perforation 0.905 <.01 0.905 <.01 −667.95 0.00 −667.78 0.00
Pancreatic Disease 0.657 <.01 0.657 <.01 −1061.98 <.01 −1065.62 <.01
Inflammatory Bowel Disease 1.054 0.22 1.053 0.23 −146.24 0.54 −147.79 0.54
Bone/Joint/Muscle Infections/Necrosis 2.468 <.01 2.466 <.01 3429.72 <.01 3427.43 <.01
Rheumatoid Arthritis and Inflammatory Connective Tissue
Disease
0.917 <.01 0.917 <.01 −163.11 0.05 −163.96 0.05
Severe Hematological Disorders 1.057 0.21 1.059 0.19 82.79 0.72 85.35 0.71
Disorders of Immunity 1.079 0.10 1.079 0.10 212.16 0.38 216.60 0.37
Drug/Alcohol Psychosis 4.755 <.01 4.765 <.01 6377.99 <.01 6379.30 <.01
Drug/Alcohol Dependence 1.443 <.01 1.449 <.01 866.60 0.08 878.27 0.08
Schizophrenia 0.532 <.01 0.531 <.01 −672.90 0.23 −683.61 0.22
Major Depressive, Bipolar, and Paranoid Disorders 0.995 0.84 0.993 0.79 79.90 0.57 77.78 0.58
Quadriplegia, Other Extensive Paralysis 0.579 0.00 0.577 0.00 −1305.80 0.08 −1312.71 0.08
Paraplegia 1.295 0.14 1.292 0.15 4976.07 <.01 4972.00 <.01
Spinal Cord Disorders/Injuries 0.754 <.01 0.753 <.01 −665.65 0.02 −665.73 0.02
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rate setting system, rather than under regular DRG rules.
Our standardized costs assigns a common cost to spe-
cific services regardless of whether or not the provider
falls into a special class.
Adjustments for provider specific differences in payment
designed to achieve other social goals
In some cases, certain providers are eligible to receive add-
ons to their Medicare payments by virtue of their case mix,
function, or costs. Examples are the extra disproportionate
Table 4 Complete regression models for knee degeneration episodes (Continued)
Muscular Dystrophy 0.455 0.19 0.452 0.19 −2069.78 0.38 −2089.42 0.37
Polyneuropathy 1.067 <.01 1.067 0.00 331.19 0.00 331.35 0.00
Multiple Sclerosis 0.632 <.01 0.629 0.00 −975.37 0.09 −988.91 0.08
Parkinsons and Huntingtons Diseases 0.852 <.01 0.853 0.00 258.96 0.25 265.40 0.24
Seizure Disorders and Convulsions 1.101 0.01 1.102 0.01 42.32 0.83 44.85 0.82
Coma, Brain Compression/Anoxic Damage 1.168 0.13 1.169 0.13 −319.24 0.55 −314.72 0.55
Respirator Dependence/Tracheostomy Status 0.433 <.01 0.442 0.00 −1904.37 0.04 −1888.25 0.04
Respiratory Arrest 1.291 0.13 1.289 0.14 982.22 0.26 976.57 0.27
Cardio-Respiratory Failure and Shock 2.12 <.01 2.136 <.01 2272.11 <.01 2288.18 <.01
Congestive Heart Failure 1.016 0.46 1.014 0.50 34.53 0.74 32.35 0.76
Acute Myocardial Infarction 0.698 <.01 0.696 <.01 −1073.10 <.01 −1079.00 <.01
Unstable Angina and Other Acute Ischemic Heart Disease 1.051 0.05 1.052 0.05 211.42 0.12 214.37 0.12
Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial Infarction 1.478 <.01 1.476 <.01 866.16 <.01 864.08 <.01
Specified Heart Arrhythmias 1.078 <.01 1.079 <.01 180.90 0.01 183.43 0.01
Cerebral Hemorrhage 0.726 <.01 0.729 0.00 −322.67 0.42 −317.69 0.43
Ischemic or Unspecified Stroke 0.931 0.02 0.93 0.02 −171.89 0.26 −173.23 0.26
Hemiplegia/Hemiparesis 0.785 <.01 0.785 0.00 −397.62 0.21 −400.07 0.21
Cerebral Palsy and Other Paralytic Syndromes 1.543 <.01 1.537 0.00 1015.38 0.15 1009.78 0.16
Vascular Disease with Complications 1.152 <.01 1.152 <.01 456.53 0.00 456.91 0.00
Vascular Disease 1.307 <.01 1.307 <.01 741.59 <.01 741.82 <.01
Cystic Fibrosis 0.07 <.01 0.07 0.00 −3123.65 0.067 −3148.35 0.07
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 1.498 <.01 1.495 <.01 972.38 <.01 968.82 <.01
Aspiration and Specified Bacterial Pneumonias 0.555 <.01 0.551 <.01 −1123.07 0.00 −1135.55 0.00
Pneumococcal Pneumonia, Emphysema, Lung Abscess 0.868 0.11 0.865 0.10 −370.29 0.42 −372.75 0.42
Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy and Vitreous Hemorrhage 0.602 <.01 0.601 <.01 −1144.23 0.00 −1143.37 0.00
Dialysis Status 0.603 0.02 0.599 0.01 −1295.52 0.24 −1308.01 0.24
Renal Failure 1.263 <.01 1.263 <.01 548.15 <.01 549.32 <.01
Nephritis 1.531 <.01 1.53 <.01 1521.63 0.00 1519.22 0.00
Decubitus Ulcer of Skin 1.896 <.01 1.891 <.01 2250.55 <.01 2244.65 <.01
Chronic Ulcer of Skin, Except Decubitus 0.904 <.01 0.903 0.00 −53.72 0.71 −55.19 0.70
Extensive Third-Degree Burns 0.277 0.21 0.271 0.20 −1731.37 0.63 −1759.98 0.63
Severe Head Injury 0.581 0.31 0.58 0.31 −732.45 0.78 −720.63 0.78
Major Head Injury 0.796 <.01 0.798 0.00 −953.25 0.01 −952.89 0.01
Vertebral Fractures without Spinal Cord Injury 0.671 <.01 0.671 <.01 −746.57 <.01 −750.99 <.01
Hip Fracture/Dislocation 0.752 <.01 0.752 <.01 −622.68 0.00 −621.20 0.00
Traumatic Amputation 7.719 <.01 7.699 <.01 7341.31 <.01 7337.40 <.01
Amputation, Lower Limb/Amputation Complications 8.228 <.01 8.202 <.01 8871.35 <.01 8868.30 <.01
Major Complications of medical Care and Trauma 4.163 <.01 4.167 <.01 5813.92 <.01 5817.42 <.01
Major Organ Transplant Status 0.545 <.01 0.545 0.00 −1045.99 0.24 −1059.98 0.24
Artificial Openings for Feeding or Elimination 1.063 0.39 1.065 0.37 656.54 0.10 659.92 0.10
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payments that are paid to some hospitals. Under our proce-
dures, for each specific hospital service, these extra pay-
ments are averaged out across all Medicare patients,
regardless of which hospital they receive their care in.
Adjustments for specific services
Physician Services (except anesthesia)
For services with RVUs associated with them, the num-
ber of RVUs for each service (differentiating between
provision in facility or nonfacility settings, as recorded in
claims) was multiplied by the national conversion rate.
Modifier codes that affect payment (but not those asso-
ciated with HPSAs, etc.) and, where relevant, number of
units, were incorporated into standardized costs. This
procedure eliminates geographic adjustments. For carrier
priced services that do not have RVU assignments, na-
tional means per HCPCS codes were assigned.
Anesthesiology services
Standardized costs were based on national mean allowed
charges by HCPCS code. This approach was used in
large part because of complex rules regarding supervi-
sion of CRNAs by anesthesiologists, for which incom-
plete information was contained in claims files.
Part B Drugs
Calculated as average national per unit payment made
anytime in 2006 by HCPCS code multiplied by the num-
ber of units.
Clinical Laboratory Services
Standardized costs were calculated as the National Limit
Allowance (NLA) associated with each clinical lab HCPCS
code. This standardized geographic variations across car-
riers. Nationally, nearly all clinical lab services are paid at
NLA levels.
Ambulance services
Assigned average allowed charge by ambulance HCPCS
code, which adjusts for both payment differences across
payment areas, rural add-on payments, and geographic
differences in the average distances traveled.
Community-based Ambulatory Surgical Centers
Based on HCPCS code and location of service, services
were assigned the 2006 national APC conversion factor
times the APC relative weight, with adjustments for
modifiers.
Hospital short-term acute inpatient services
Standardized costs were based on national average pay-
ment per DRG, with adjustments for transfers. No differ-
entiation is made for CAHs or Maryland hospitals,
whether the hospital received DSH or GME payments,
or hospitals qualifying for bad debt adjustments.
Long-term care hospitals
Standardized costs were based on the 2006 long-term care
national base rate times the LTC-DRG relative weight.
Inpatient rehabilitation facilities
The standardized cost was based on the mean national
payment per CMG (case mix group).
Skilled nursing facilities
We assigned the mean national per diem payment per
RUG (Resource Use Group) score times the length of
stay. Standardized costs eliminated the differential pay-
ment levels for urban and rural SNFs, as well as swing
beds in CAHs.
Home health agencies
We assigned 2006 national average cost per HHRG
(home health resource group) for claims based on
HHRGs. When the number of visits in the episode was
less than five, standardized costs were based on the sum
of nationally set (i.e. before geographic adjustments), per
visit amounts associated with the type of visits listed in
the claim, consistent with payment rules.
Table 5 Family Income Imputation Model
Variable Coefficient P-Value
Intercept 10.02 <.01
Age 70–74 (ref. group = age 65–69) −0.14 <.01
Age 75-79 −0.21 <.01
Age 80-84 −0.40 <.01
Age 85-89 −0.55 <.01
Age 90-94 −0.86 <.01
Age 95+ −1.37 0.08
Female −0.34 <.01
Black (ref. group = white nonhispanic) −0.40 <.01
Hispanic −0.45 <.01
Asian −0.34 0.08
Other Race −0.35 <.01
Large Metro (ref. group = nonmetro) 0.22 0.02
Small Metro 0.07 0.02
% Black, 65+ −0.0014 0.44
% Below Poverty, 65+ −0.0140 0.02
Average Income, 65+ 0.0121 <.01
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prospective payment system (OPPS)
Services paid under OPPS were assigned the relevant
APC value (conversion value times the APC relative
weight). Payment discounts for multiple procedures
were made. No hold harmless payment adjustments
were made for cancer, children’so rs m a l lr u r a lh o s -
pitals and no special adjustments were made for
CAHs, Indian Health Service facilities, or facilities in
Maryland.
Hospital outpatient services not covered by OPPS
Standardized costs were based on the mean national
payment per HCPCS code, with adjustments made
for number of units and modifiers where applicable.
No differentiation is made between hospital based
and freestanding facilities contained in the outpatient
claims files for equivalent services.
Durable Medical Equipment
Standardized costs were assigned as the average national
payment by HCPCS code-modifier combination. Modi-
fiers account for new vs. used equipment and whether
the equipment was rented or purchased. Standardized
costs account for the number of units, where relevant.
Complete regression models for knee
degeneration episodes
This section reports the complete regression models with
all independent variables used to estimate the likelihood of
a surgical episode (logistic regression) and the cost per epi-
sode (linear regression). Regression models for the other
conditions are identical except for the variable measuring
the supply of the relevant specialists, ophthalmologists for
cataract episodes and urologists for benign neoplasm of the
prostate. The variables that indicate the CTS site, individ-
ual’s demographic characteristics, and the presence of spe-
cific medical conditions are all dichotomous (Table 4).
Regression model used to impute family income
This model was estimated using data for 5,554 elderly
respondents to the 2003 Community Tracking Study
Household Survey. The dependent variable was the
natural log of family income, which was converted to
natural numbers using a smearing adjustment. The
model also includes site dummies for the 60 CTS
sites (coefficients not shown). Zip code area charac-
teristics are from the 2000 Census. The parameters of
this model, which has a R
2=0.25, were applied to the
similar characteristics of patients in each of the con-
dition episodes to impute a value of family income
(Table 5).
Table 6 Mix of specific services for cataract episodes in low and high payment ratio counties
HCPCS
Code
Procedure Name Counties in the 1
st(lowest) Quartile
of the Ratio of Medicare Payments
for Surgical to Non-surgical Episodes
Counties in the 4
th(highest) Quartile
of the Ratio of Medicare Payments
for Surgical to Non-surgical Episodes
Ratio of
Medicare
Payments
in the 1
stto
the
4
thQuartiles
Pct. of
Claims
Average Medicare
Payment
Pct. of
Claims
Average Medicare
Payment
66982 Cataract surgery, complex 1.3% $774 < 1% ––
66984 Cataract surgery w/iol, 1 stage 22.9 682 25.7 $569 1.20
66821 After cataract laser surgery 6.4 256 6.1 218 1.18
99244 Office consultation 1.5 137 1.5 122 1.12
92004 Eye exam, new patient 2.0 97 2.0 87 1.12
00142 Anesthesia for procedures on eye; lens
surgery
12.7 81 13.7 62 1.32
92014 Eye exam & treatment 7.3 76 5.3 65 1.17
92135 Ophthalmic dx imaging 1.1 43 < 1% ––
99214 Office/outpatient visit, established
patient
1.6 67 1.6 58 1.15
92012 Eye exam established pat 4.5 54 2.7 46 1.20
76519 Echo exam of eye 6.4 53 7.2 37 1.43
92136 Ophthalmic biometry 5.5 52 6.6 38 1.34
99213 Office/outpatient visit, established
patient
2.3 43 2.2 38 1.13
Q1003 Ntiol category 3 1.6 40 1.6 40 1.00
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services for surgical cataract episodes
In order to explore the possible extent of endogeneity bias
in the estimation of the cataract episode model, we com-
pared the average mix of specific services (by HCPCS
code) provided to surgical and non-surgical episodes in
the 1
st and 4
th quartiles of counties grouped by the ratio
of the Medicare payment per episode for surgical episodes
relative to non-surgical episodes. The specific services
listed account for at least 1% of total claims per episode.
The table lists services by the average Medicare payment
per service from the most to least costly, and shows the
share of claims attributed to each service and the ratio of
the average Medicare payment for each service in the two
groups of counties (Table 6).
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